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FAMILY LAW: THIRD PARTY CUSTODY AFTER
BABY GIRL L. AND A.G.S.: NOW WHERE ARE WE?
ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
Contested child custody proceedings, although normally associated with
divorce, have, in recent years, increasingly involved parties other than parents
and forums other than the divorce court. This Article discusses custody battles
between third parties, usually grandparents, and the child's parent or parents.
The area has always been a difficult one in Oklahoma because it involves
different types of proceedings and potentially different substantive standards
from traditional custody battles between parents. Recent decisions by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Baby Girl L' and In re Guardianship of
A. G. S.2 have prompted a reexamination of this problem to determine whether
any coherent pattern has emerged.
L The Type of Proceeding
Part I of this Article covers the different types of proceedings in which
child custody decisions may occur: divorce, guardianship, habeas corpus, and
juvenile.3 Part II concerns the substantive standard for deciding a custody
case involving nonparents.
A. Divorce: Problems of Intervention and Abatement
Custody of a child may be awarded to a third party in a divorce action.
Title 10, section 21. 1A of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that custody shall
be awarded in an order of preference according to the best interests of a child.
The list, which begins with parents and then follows with grandparents and
others, clearly indicates that custody may be awarded to third parties.4 The
© 2003 Robert G. Spector
* Glenn R. Watson Centennial Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center.
J.D., 1966, B.S. 1963, University of Wisconsin.
1. 2002 OK9,51 P.3d 544.
2. 2003 OK 1, 65 P.3d 587.
3. Adoption and termination of parental rights cases are also custody proceedings. A full
discussion of these two actions is beyond the scope of this article. They will be discussed only
insofar as they relate to the other proceedings.
4. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 21 (West) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 2 1.1(A)). The section states:
A. Custody should be awarded or a guardian appointed in the following order
of preference according to the best interests of the child to:
1. A parent or to both parents jointly except as otherwise provided in
subsection B of this section;
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Oklahoma Supreme Court, in McDonald v. Wrigley,' overruled Logan v.
Smith6 and held that the grandparent had a right to intervene in a divorce case
to seek a modification of the divorce decree awarding custody to her instead
of to the mother of the child.7
However, intervention by third parties requires a proceeding in which to
intervene. When one of the parties to a divorce dies, the divorce proceeding
ordinarily terminates.8 In Turley v. Turley,9 the grandfather filed a motion to
modify the divorce decree to grant him custody following the death of the
custodial mother.'° The noncustodial father filed a habeas corpus petition
seeking custody." The trial court judge consolidated the two actions,
whereupon the father voluntarily dismissed his habeas action. 2 The trial court
found the father unfit and granted custody to the grandfather in the divorce
proceeding. 3 On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed that the father
was unfit but held that it was error to grant the grandfather custody in the
divorce proceeding because, when the mother died, the divorce case abated
and therefore there was no decree to modify. 4 The court remanded the case
with instructions to reinstate the habeas proceeding and award the grandfather
custody. 15
2. A grandparent;
3. A person who was indicated by the wishes of a deceased parent;
4. A relative of either parent;
5. The person in whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and
stable environment including but not limited to a foster parent; or
6. Any other person deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide
adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Id.
5. 1994 OK 25,870 P.2d 777.
6. 1979 OK 148, 602 P.2d 647.
7. McDonald, 12, 870 P.2d at 782.
8. Chastain v. Posey, 1983 OK 46, 6, 665 P.2d 1179, 1181. It is well settled that if one
party dies pending an appeal from a divorce action, the parties are divorced. The only exception
to that rule is if one party is appealing the granting of the divorce. See 43 OKLA. STAT. § 127
(2001); Balfour v. Page, 1972 OK 1, 10, 492 P.2d 1088, 1091. The deceased spouse's estate
may continue the appeal only if property rights are involved. See Pellow v. Pellow, 1985 OK
88, 24, 714 P.2d 593, 598; Siler v. Siler, 1960 OK 19, 15, 350 P.2d 510, 513. Provisions
of the divorce decree regarding alimony, child support, custody and visitation lapse with the
death of one of the parties.
9. 1981 OK 161, 638 P.2d 469.
10. Id. 1 1, 638 P.2d at 470.
11. Id. 2, 638 P.2d at 470.
12. Id.
13. Id. 1, 638 P.2d at 470.
14. Id. 4, 638 P.2d at 470-71.
15. Id. 1 12, 638 P.2d at 471; see also Ingles v. Hodges, 1977 OK 18, 562 P.2d 845;
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In S. W. v. Duncan 6, an unusual opinion, however, the court recently
determined that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act's 17 (UCCJEA) continuing jurisdiction provisions"I overruled Turley. 9 In
Duncan, the mother and father divorced in October 1999. In January 2000,
the mother died in an automobile accident. 20 Following the mother's death,
the maternal grandmother, aunt, and uncle cared for the child.2' Two weeks
after the mother's death, the father refused to return the child from visitation,
took the child to Kansas, and immediately instituted a custody proceeding
there.22 The aunt and uncle filed a guardianship proceeding in Oklahoma two
days later, in the same county where the divorce proceeding occurred.2 3 The
Oklahoma court issued a temporary order, indicating that it had jurisdiction
to determine custody, and placed guardianship with the aunt and uncle. The
court thereafter phoned the Kansas court. The Kansas judge declined to
indicate which court would have jurisdiction or what would occur in the
Kansas proceeding. 24 The father appealed the decision to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.25
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.26 The court held
that the issue was whether an Oklahoma court retained jurisdiction to modify
the custodial provisions of a divorce decree following the death of one of the
parties to the decree. 27 The court correctly noted that upon the death of one
of the parents, the other parent automatically becomes the custodial parent, as
if no custody order was ever issued.28 Title 10, section 21.1 B of the Oklahoma
Statutes provides that upon the death of the custodial parent, the noncustodial
parent is given custody, except under certain defined circumstances.29
Hughes v. Bowen, 1943 OK 380, 143 P.2d 139; Hedtker v. Kukuk, 1923 OK 873, 220 P. 615.
16. 2001 OK 39, 24 P.3d 846.
17. 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 551-101 to -402 (2001).
18. Id. § 551-202.
19. Duncan, j 17-18, 24 P.3d at 852.
20. Id. 1 2, 24 P.3d at 848.
21. Id. 13, 24 P.3d at 848.
22. Id. 4, 24 P.3d at 848.
23. Id. 1 5, 24 P.3d at 848.
24. Id. 1 8, 24 P.3d at 848.
25. Id. 9, 24 P.3d at 848.
26. Id. 34, 24 P.3d at 857-58.
27. Id. 17, 24 P.3d at 852-53.
28. Id.
29. At the time Duncan was decided, the text of section 21.1 (B) read as follows:
B. When a parent having physical custody and providing support to a child
becomes deceased, in awarding custody or appointing as guardian of the child the
noncustodial parent, the court may deny the custody or guardianship only if:
1. The noncustodial parent has willfully failed, refused, or neglected to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The court found that the section applied, but noted that the statute did not
expressly provide that the jurisdiction of the divorce court continued
following the death of one of the parties." It then held that the UCCJEA
expressly provided for the continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court and,
moreover, that the death of one of the parties was not listed in the UCCJEA
as one of the bases for ending that jurisdiction.3 This, the court said, had the
effect of overruling Turley.32
The court then found that the Kansas court incorrectly characterized the
Kansas proceeding as a potential conflict between two states attempting to
contribute to the support of the child for a period of at least twelve (12) months
immediately preceding the determination of custody or guardianship action:
a. in substantial compliance with a support provision contained in a decree of
divorce, or a decree of separate maintenance or an order adjudicating
responsibility to support in a reciprocal enforcement of support proceeding,
paternity action, juvenile proceeding, guardianship proceeding, or orders of
modification to such decree, or other lawful orders of support entered by a court
of competent jurisdiction adjudicating the duty, amount, and manner of support,
or
b. according to such parent's financial ability to contribute to such child's
support if no provision for support is provided in a decree of divorce or an order
of modification subsequent thereto;
2. The noncustodial parent has abandoned the child; or
3. The court finds it would be detrimental to the health or safety of the child
for the noncustodial parent to have custody or be appointed guardian.
10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B) (Supp. 2000), amended by Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 21 (West).
30. Duncan, 21, 24 P.3d at 852-53.
31. Id. The continuing jurisdiction provision of the UCCJEA is title 43, section 551-202
of the Oklahoma Statutes, which provides-that:
§ 551-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
A. Except as otherwise provided in Section 16 of this act, a court of this state
which has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 13 or 15 of
this act has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
1. A court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one
parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the
child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this
state.
B. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does
not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that
determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under
Section 13 of this act.
43 OKLA. STAT. § 551-202 (2001).
32. Duncan, 17-18, 24 P.3d at 852.
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exercise initial custody jurisdiction." The Kansas court had determined that
Oklahoma was the home state of the child and, under Kansas cases
interpreting its version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 34 the
court must defer to the home state because Kansas could only exercise
significant connection jurisdiction.35 The Kansas court was still unsure
whether the Oklahoma trial court would prefer that Kansas decide this case.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that because Kansas was attempting
to modify the Oklahoma decision, it was not acting in accordance with the
UCCJEA and therefore any action on its part was improper.36
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ultimate decision, that Oklahoma
had jurisdiction to proceed in this case under the UCCJEA, is correct, its
reasoning seems strained. It was unnecessary to overturn settled Oklahoma
law on the relationship between death and divorce. The UCCJEA has no
relationship to internal state procedural matters. The court's statement that
the UCCJEA requires that the "divorce" court continue to exercise jurisdiction
under section 551-202 is incorrect. It does not require that any particular
state court continue to exercise jurisdiction, but merely provides that
Oklahoma jurisdiction continue vis4--vis any other state, assuming that local
law would provide for continuing jurisdiction. 37 Local law, at the time that the
trial court made its determination, provided that the jurisdiction of the divorce
court ended when one of the parties died.3"
This determination, that the divorce court continues to exercise jurisdiction
over custody issues following the death of one of the parents, affects the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). While the ICWA does not apply to
divorce and delinquency cases, 39 it does apply in other custody proceedings.4"
Authorizing the continuation of the divorce proceedings following the death
33. Id. 126, 24 P.3d at 855-56.
34. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is the predecessor to the UCCJEA. For
a full discussion of the two acts, see Robert G. Spector, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 301 (1998).
35. Duncan, 28, 24 P.3d at 856.
36. Id.
37. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 551-202 (2001).
38. It should be noted that the court specifically refused to decide whether, when a court
awards a third party custody in a divorce proceeding, the jurisdiction of the divorce court ends
when one of the parents dies. The appropriate result seemingly would be that a third party
seeking custody in a divorce case should specifically intervene and be made a party to the case.
This would obviate the problem and allow the divorce case to continue upon the death of one
of the parents.
39. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.3 (2001).
40. See In re Guardianship of Q.G.M., 1991 OK 29, 7, 808 P.2d 684, 687-88
(guardianship case).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
of one of the parents drastically reduces the number of cases where the ICWA
is applicable.
B. Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus is a traditional method of contesting child custody. A
custody proceeding between a parent and a nonparent may be commenced by
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the child resides.4' In the
past, the typical scenario occurred when the child lived with the grandparents
or other relatives following the death of the custodial parent. As courts held
that the divorce court lost jurisdiction with the death of one of the parents, the
noncustodial parent used the writ to obtain custody. Today, that is not
necessary, as the parent would continue in the divorce proceeding. The court
is thus compelled to join the grandparents. If the child is not living with the
grandparents, but with the noncustodial parent, the grandparents also have
standing to begin a custody proceeding by use of the writ.
In Ex parte Moulin,42 the court authorized the use of a habeas proceeding
to determine whether to give custody to the child's natural father, whose
parental rights had been previously terminated, or to the maternal uncle. 43 The
court held that the statute authorized the use of the writ to "enforce the rights
and for the protection of infants." The statute does not limit the persons who
may enforce or protect.45 While Moulin suggests that anyone would have
standing under title 12, section 1354 of the Oklahoma Statutes to initiate a
custody proceeding, courts generally restrict the use of a habeas proceeding
to family members related by blood; no stranger has been granted standing
under the statute.46 While grandparents clearly may use the writ to begin a
custody case, today it would probably be easier for the grandparents to
41. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1354 (2001); Spahr v. Swanson, 1979 OK 86, 1 5,596 P.2d 549,
550; Young v. Reynolds, 1978 OK CIV APP 43, 5, 586 P.2d 759, 760.
42. 1950 OK 82, 217 P.2d 1029.
43. Id. 1 29, 217 P.2d at 1034.
44. Id. 27, 217 P.2d at 1034 (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1354 (1941)).
45. See id. 28, 217 P.2d at 1034; see also In re Borcherding's Custody, 1945 OK 247,
IN 13-16, 162 P.2d 184, 186 (use of habeas approved after parent's death to decide custody
between two sets of grandparents).
46. See Young v. Reynolds, 1978 OK CIV APP 43, 5,586 P.2d 759, 761 (habeas not an
alternative method to raise paternity). For other cases where grandparents have used habeas
corpus as a method of obtaining custody of the child, see Gibson v. Dorris, 1963 OK 235, 1,
386 P.2d 186, 187 (mother and child had been living with grandmother; when mother and child
left to join father in France, grandmother filed habeas) and Scroggin v. Griffin, 1939 OK 345,
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intervene in the divorce proceeding, now that the divorce court has continuing
jurisdiction.
The writ may be used in two other situations. The first occurs when no
previous custody order exists. Often the parents leave the child with third
parties to take care of pressing business. Occasionally the third party refuses
to return the child; habeas corpus is the method used to obtain the child's
return.47 Second, the writ is used to enforce custody decrees against third
parties.48
One case also suggests that the noncustodial parent may properly use the
writ to enforce visitation rights.49 Because the writ tests the immediate right
to the custody of the child, it may not be used to modify a prior decree. °
Thus, the court may provide for child support in a habeas corpus proceeding.5
C. Guardianships
Guardianships for minors are governed by title 30, sections 2-101 to 2-116
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Oklahoma recognizes a distinction between the
guardian of a minor and the guardian of the minor's estate.5" Because the
guardian of the person of a minor is entitled to custody, guardianships
constitute custody proceedings.
The statute permits a court to appoint a guardian whenever it "appears
necessary or convenient."53 The statute has not been interpreted, however, to
authorize the court to appoint a guardian for a child for any reason.54
Guardianship proceedings are considered proper only when no prior order
concerning the child exists. Therefore, guardianship proceedings may not be
used to modify a prior custody determination.55 Normal guardianship
proceedings occur when the custodial parent dies and the grandparents seek
47. See Long v. Mclninch, 1953 OK 372, 15, 264 P.2d 767, 768; Nasalroad v. Gayhart,
1953 OK 144, 1,257 P.2d 299,299; Currin v. Chadwick, 1952 OK 78,241 P.2d 947; Jamison
v. Gilbert, 1913 OK 541, 1, 135 P. 342, 343; Zink v. Milner, 1913 OK 418,1 1, 135 P. 1, 1.
48. See Exparte Kelley, 1953 OK 243, 1,261 P.2d 452, 453.
49. See Wilkerson v. Davila, 1960 OK 63, 1 18, 351 P.2d 311, 314.
50. See Application of Guthrie, 19900K CIV APP 36,17,792 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Means,
J., concurring).
51. Act Relating to Marriage and Divorce, ch. 302, § 3,2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
(to be codified at 43 OKLA. STAT. § 110(D)).
52. 30 OKLA. STAT. § 2-101 (2001).
53. Id.
54. See Guardianship of Hill, 1977 OK 156, 16,569 P.2d 444,447 (neither natural father
whose child has been adopted nor child himself can commence guardianship when child is in
an otherwise intact family).
55. See Wilkerson v. Davila, 1960 OK 63, 12, 351 P.2d 311, 311 (guardianship
proceedings inappropriate to try intra-parental claims to custody).
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custody of the child. While habeas corpus is also proper, most cases have
been brought as guardianship proceedings.56 Thus, guardianship and habeas
corpus are, in this context, interchangeable procedures for obtaining custody
of a child. Note that grandparents may also use the procedure after the death
of a parent of an otherwise intact household.57
D. Juvenile Proceeding
Proceedings under the Children's Code58 can also be brought to declare
children deprived because of neglect by the custodial parent. 9 Once a petition
is filed, the juvenile court may, if it finds the child deprived, remove the child
from the parents and place the child with third parties, including
grandparents.6" Today, the process of invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court is a public law matter and only the appropriate authorities may bring
such an action.6 Before 1982, private parties participated significantly in
juvenile court proceedings because the law allowed such parties to invoke the
court's jurisdiction and use it to obtain custody.6 2
E. The Enigma of Title 10, Section 9
Title 10, section 9 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides:
The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial
cognizance in a civil action in the district court brought by the
child or any grandparent on the child's behalf, or by its relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, or by the
officers of the poor where the child resides or by any foster parent
of the child or any person who has been a foster parent of the child;
and when the abuse is established, the child may be freed from the
56. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 1971 OK 151,492 P.2d 324; In re Young's Guardianship, 1955
OK 82, 281 P.2d 739; In re Hight's Guardianship, 1944 OK 143, 148 P.2d 475; Hughes v.
Bowen,1943 OK 380, 143 P.2d 139; Exparte Frear, 1941 OK 395, 119 P.2d 854; Weber v.
Linch, 1978 OK CIV APP 14,15,579 P.2d 213,214.
57. See In re Guardianship of Walling, 1986 OK 50, 1 1, 727 P.2d 586, 587 (mother
acquitted of murdering father and grandparent obtained guardianship when mother left for
California with the children).
58. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7001-1.1 to 7007-1.8 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
59. Id. §§ 7001-1.3, 7002-3.1.
60. Id. § 7004-1.1 (2001).
61. See id. § 7003-3.1 (Supp. 2002).
62. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 105 (1961) (repealed 1968); Price v. Price, 1977 OK 205, 1,
573 P.2d 251, 252; In re Vilas, 1970 OK 190, 1,475 P.2d 615, 616; Montgomery v. Moore,
1955 OK 370, 1 1, 292 P.2d 1040, 1041; In re O'Neill, 1976 OK CIV APP 43, 1 1, 554 P.2d
864, 865. Today these cases are obsolete.
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dominion of the parent, and the duty of support and education
enforced.63
Although this statute has existed since statehood, its exact meaning remains
obscure. In Lively v. Lively,' the court noted that the statute, although
dormant for many years, received new life when the legislature amended it to
include grandparents and foster parents as persons who may bring the action.65
This indicated to the court that the statute should be used as the basis for third-
party custody claims. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court's determination
that the child's grandparents could not bring a custody action under this
section."
Substantial problems of interpretation still exist, however. Although the
Lively court authorized the use of the statute as a procedural vehicle for a
third-party custody action, its language might be interpreted to provide a
private action for termination of parental rights. In Maupin v. Hasty,67
however, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that private plaintiffs
could not use the statute to effectuate a termination of parental rights.68 The
result seems logical, because, if the statute were so construed, it would raise
substantial issues concerning its relationship with the comparable provisions
in the Children's Code, as well as the standards for an adoption without
consent in the Adoption Code.69
Moreover, the Lively court failed to interpret the phrase "abuse of parental
authority." In Maupin, however, the court noted in dicta that the statute refers
to "abuse of authority," rather than "neglect of duty."7 Therefore, in the
court's opinion, a failure to pay child support or to visit the child does not
amount to "abuse of parental authority," although it may demonstrate parental
neglect.71 Given that the law allows parental neglect to form the basis of an
action in juvenile court to declare the child deprived, which could result in the
63. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 9 (2001).
64. 1993 OK CIV APP 62, 853 P.2d 787.
65. Id. 14, 853 P.2d at 789-90. The statute was amended in 1991 by the Oklahoma
legislature. Act Relating to Children, ch. 296, § 26, 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws 2054, 2088.
66. Lively, 15, 853 P.2d at 790.
67. 2000 OK CIV APP 16, 996 P.2d 468.
68. Id. 1 6, 996 P.2d at 470.
69. Compare 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7006-1.1 (2001) (termination of parental rights), with id.
§§ 7505-4.1 to 7505-4.3 (adoption without parental consent). There is also an issue as to
whether a successful action under this section has the result of emancipating the child. If so,
there is an issue as to the relationship between this section and title 10, section 91 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, which deals with emancipation.
70. Maupin, 8, 996 P.2d at 470.
71. Id.
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termination of parental rights, it appears that considerable confusion still
exists in the court's mind as to the content of the phrase "abuse of authority."
II. The Substantive Standard: The Original Order
A. Custody Cases Between Parents and Nonparents
1. The Judicially Created Standard
The Oklahoma Supreme Court often has held that a parent's custodial rights
are protected by both the United States and the State of Oklahoma
constitutions.72 Oklahoma cases also hold that the substantive standard to
determine custody in third-party cases does not vary with the nature of the
proceeding.73 Prior to 1994, however, the court disagreed regarding the
content of the substantive standard.
Most of these early cases held that only parental unfitness allows a third
party to obtain custody of a child.74 The evidence establishing the parent's
unfitness must be clear and convincing.75 Unfitness means that the parent's
character and habits are such that provision for the child's welfare cannot
reasonably be expected from the parent, or that for some other reason the
parent is unable to care for the child. The unfitness necessary to deprive a
parent of custody must be positive and not comparative. In other words, the
mere fact that the child might be better cared for by a third person is
insufficient to justify taking a child from the parent.76
In spite of the clear language in most cases addressing third-party custody,
another line of cases, prior to 1994, suggested that custody in third party cases
72. See, e.g., Application of Grover, 19840K 20, 1 9, 681 P.2d 81, 83.
73. See id. 1 10, 681 P.2d at 83 (habeas proceeding); Haralson v. Haralson, 1979 OK 73,
7, 595 P.2d 443, 445 (modification of divorce decree); Price v. Price, 1977 OK 205, 7, 573
P.2d 251, 253 (juvenile proceeding); In re Rogers, 1971 OK 151, 17, 492 P.2d 324, 327
(consolidated habeas and guardianship case); In re Hight's Guardianship, 1944 OK 143, 16,
148 P.2d 475, 481 (guardianship).
74. See Grover, 18, 681 P.2d at 83; Hood v. Adams, 1964 OK 217, 10, 396 P.2d 483,
485; Alexander v. Kennedy, 1941 OK 392, 7, 119 P.2d 823, 824; Tyler v. Oden, 1941 OK
147, 8, 114 P.2d 447, 448; Scroggin v. Griffin, 1939 OK 345, 4, 94 P.2d 244, 245;
Breckenridge v. Breckenridge, 19240K 896,113,229 P.774, 776; Hedtke v. Kukuk, 19230K
873, 1, 220 P. 615, 615; Lynch v. Poe, 1916 OK 562, 2, 157 P. 907, 908; Zink v. Milner,
1913 OK 418, 3, 135 P. 1, 3.
75. See Marshall v. Marshall, 1976 OK 127, 1 10, 555 P.2d 598,600; McVey v. Chester,
1955 OK 275, 11, 288 P.2d 740, 742; Marcum v. Marcum, 1954 OK 4, 35, 265 P.2d 723,
727; Hight's Guardianship, 17, 148 P.2d at 480; Sherrick v. Butler, 1936 OK 70, 8,53 P.2d
1097, 1099.
76. See Gibson v. Dorris, 1963 OK 235, 9, 386 P.2d 186, 188; Scroggin, 6, 94 P.2d at
245; Jamison v. Gilbert, 1913 OK 541,14, 135 P. 342,345.
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is solely a determination of the best interests of the child. Ex parte Parker77
exemplifies these cases. At birth, the mother was unable to care for the child
and allowed her neighbors to do so; three years later, she married and
requested the child's return.78 The court denied her application for habeas
corpus, noting that she had rarely visited the child.79 Additionally, her
husband served in the military, and she had to move often.8" The court opined
that all custody cases ultimately must be determined on the basis of the best
interests of the child and granted custody to the neighbor.8
The two lines of cases were not as disparate as they might appear. First,
since 1960 the Oklahoma Supreme Court has consistently held that before a
court can grant custody to a third party, the third party must prove the parent
is affirmatively unfit by clear and convincing evidence.82 While none of the
"best-interests" cases has been overruled, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
neither cited them nor used their language in more than forty years. It seems
safe to say that the court has departed from the "best interests" line of cases.
Second, in many of the "best interests" cases, the parent was either
affirmatively unfit or had abandoned the child.83 Thus, in terms of their
results, the two lines of cases were not as different as their approaches
suggest.
In any event, the Oklahoma Supreme Court resolved the issue in McDonald
v. Wrigley," where it held that custody, even on a temporary basis, can only
be awarded to a nonparent if the court finds the parent unfit by clear and
77. 1945 OK 61, 156 P.2d 584.
78. Id. 1 7, 156 P.2d at 586.
79. Id. 3, 156 P.2d at 586.
80. Id. 1 1, 156 P.2d at 589 (Welch, J., dissenting).
81. Id. 1121-24, 156 P.2d at 588-89. For other cases which utilize the same approach, see,
e.g., Sims v. Sims, 1960 OK 68, 1 11, 350 P.2d 493, 495; In re Young's Guardianship, 1955
OK 82, 15, 281 P.2d 739, 741; Ex Parte Hudspeth, 19540K 172, 1 11,271 P.2d 371,373;
Exparte Yahola, 1937 OK 306,15,71 P.2d 968,970; Hamann v. Miesner, 1931 OK 91, 10,
297 P. 252,253; Bishop v. Benear, 1928 OK 553, 16,270 P. 569,571; Morris v. Morris, 1921
OK 148,19, 198 P. 70, 71.
82. See, e.g., Application of Grover,1984 OK 20,1 11,681 P.2d 81, 83; Turley v. Turley,
1981 OK 161, 19, 638 P.2d 469, 471; Haralson v. Haralson, 1979 OK 73, 7, 595 P.2d 443,
445; Marshall v. Marshall, 1976 OK 127,1 10, 555 P.2d 598, 600; In re Rogers, 1971 OK 151,
17, 492 P.2d 324, 327 ; Hollick v. McDaniel, 1965 OK 64,1 21, 401 P.2d 466, 474; Hood
v. Adams, 1964 OK 217,1 10, 396 P.2d 483, 486.
83. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 1956 OK 51,1 10,294 P.2d 831, 835 (mother unfit because
she consorted with undesirable characters); Hudspeth.1 12, 271 P.2d at 373 (father had seen 15
year old child only three or four times since birth); Nasalroad v. Gayhart, 1953 OK 144, I 1,
5, 257 P.2d 299, 300 (parents had not seen child for seven years).
84. 1994 OK 25, 870 P.2d 777.
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convincing evidence.15 The court also held that the custody order must
include the conditions, determined by the trial court, that constitute parental
unfitness.8 6 Further, the parent is entitled to the child's return upon correcting
the conditions.87
2. The Problem of Baby Girl L.
In In re Baby Girl L, 8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court narrowed the
affirmatively unfit standard for one type of case. The case arose out of a
failed adoption. In such cases, the Adoption Code89 requires that there be a
"best interests" custody hearing between the party attempting to adopt the
child and the child's biological parent or parents.90 In Baby Girl L., the trial
court determined that the biological father was a fit parent and ordered
temporary joint custody to both the biological mother and father, deciding to
determine later whether to grant sole custody to one or the other.9 The court
further ordered that the custody change would not be enforced immediately,
and that the transition would be pursuant to a plan established by the court.92
The court set a hearing on the custody plan and requested experts to testify at
the hearing.93 The trial court also granted the biological mother and father
unsupervised visitation with the child.' The potential adoptive parents
appealed. 95
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held first that the statute was constitu-
tional.96 It found that the legislature could have determined that removing
children from potential adoptive parents, after a long relationship with those
parents, could psychologically harm the children. 97 The court found this
determination to be a compelling state interest that justified the legislation
when challenged on substantive due process grounds.98
At trial, the adoptive parents argued that a showing of serious psychological
harm to the child - resulting from a change in custody from the adoptive to
85. Id. '112, 870 P.2d at 781.
86. Id.
87. See id. 1 14, 870 P.2d at 782.
88. 2002 OK 9, 51 P.3d 544.
89. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7505-2.1(E) (2001).
90. Baby Girl L, 1 29, 51 P.3d at 555-56.
91. Id. 151,51 P.3d at 562.
92. Id.
93. Id. 1 10, 51 P.3d at 548.
94. Id.
95. Id. 111, 51 P.3d at 548.
96. Id. 129, 51 P.3d at 556.
97. Id. 124,51 P.3d at 556.
98. Id. 1 23, 51 P.3d at 555-56.
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the biological parent after a lengthy failed adoption - defeats a biological
father's right to custody when the father has neither had temporary custody
nor fulfilled the role of a parent.99 Therefore, the adoptive parents argued that
they should prevail in a best interests hearing."° The trial court, however,
held that if the father was a "fit parent," he was entitled to custody. 0
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that if the adoptive parents could show
serious physical harm to the child by clear and convincing evidence upon
remand, they could prevail in the custody proceeding.° 2 The court cautioned,
however, that merely showing that the child has a strong relationship with the
adoptive parents, or might be better off if left in their custody based on some
type of comparative fitness test or balancing, is insufficient to show serious
psychological harm. 3 That is, the trial court is not authorized to determine
who, between the father and the adoptive parents, would be the better
custodians for the child.
The court further held that the "serious psychological harm" must be of a
type that is both serious and enduring. It requires severe and long-term
psychological trauma, rather than simple separation anxiety. °4 The court also
mandated an inquiry into whether the "harm" could be remedied through the
efforts of the biological father.'0 5 Therefore, "the capability of the biological
parent to overcome any claim of such harm is a relevant factor in the
inquiry." '' °6 Moreover, the court held that "the conduct of the parties during
the custody dispute [was] also relevant," requiring "expert psychological and
other background examinations" to determine whether the child could be
transferred to the biological parent without harm.'07
Finally, the court held that any grant of custody to the adoptive parents
could not be permanent. 0 8 Thus, the biological father retains his parental
rights, and can file to modify custody. The court held that he would be
entitled to custody at a time when the court could transfer custody to the father
without significant psychological harm.' ° Other changes of condition might
99. Id. 29, 51 P.3d at 556.
100. Id. 29, 51 P.3d at 557.
101. Id. 1 10, 51 P.3d at 549.
102. Id. 1 34, 51 P.3d at 557.
103. Id. 1 30, 51 P.3d at 556.
104. Id. 1 31, 51 P.3d at 556.
105. See id. 1 32, 51 P.3d at 556.
106. Id. 1 32, 51 P.3d at 556.
107. Id.
108. Id. 1 34, 51 P.3d at 558.
109. Id.
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also require a change of custody."0 The court suggested that the parties
prepare a plan to facilitate the transition of the child to the biological parent. "'
Baby Girl L. is interesting in that it suggests a narrowing of the court's
approach in third party custody cases. Prior to Baby Girl L, the court focused
on the fitness of the parent. 12 The Baby Girl L court, however, focused on
the child. The custody determination rested on the issue of whether the child
would be harmed. The question - for practitioners and legal scholars - then
becomes whether this child-centered approach comports with the parental
preference approach to third party cases.
Recent decisions indicate that the court had contemplated a shift in
approach. In Stephen v. Stephen,' the court noted that the post-divorce
family unit has the same "child rearing autonomy and freedom from
unwarranted governmental interference" as the unbroken, two-parent
family. 114 In Stephen, a noncustodial father sought custody of his sons because
the custodial mother was home-schooling them against his wishes." 5 The trial
court ruled that home-schooling was not in the best interests of the children
and, unless they were returned to public school, the court would grant custody
to the father." 6 The Stephen majority reversed the order, finding that it
conflicted with the clear weight of the evidence and constituted an abuse of
discretion." 17 Justice Simms, in a special concurring opinion joined by five
justices, stated that:
It is not the business of the courts to become involved in everyday
decisions of child rearing which are properly the prerogative of the
parents or, in the case of divorced parents, the custodial parent....
In the absence of specific provisions in the divorce decree or an
agreement between the parents, the sole decision making power
over significant decisions affecting the child's welfare, including
education, resides in the custodial parent." 1
8
This language appears quite significant. In In re Herbst" 19 and Neal v.
Lee, 20 the Oklahoma Supreme Court used the same approach to limit the trial
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See cases cited supra note 82.
113. 1997 OK 53, 937 P.2d 92.
114. Id. 7, 937 P.2d at 99 (Sinuns, J., concurring).
115. Id. 1, 937 P.2d at 94.
116. Id.
117. Id. 2, 937 P.2d at 94.
118. Id. 2, 937 P.2d at 98 (Sinmns, J., concurring).
119. 1998 OK 100, 971 P.2d 395.
120. 2000 OK 90, 14 P.3d 547.
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court's discretion in ordering grandparental visitation absent a showing of
harm to the child. 2' Justice Simms's concurring opinion also formed the basis
of the decision in Kaiser v. Kaiser,122 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court
prohibited a trial court, absent evidence of harm to the child, from ordering a
modification of custody when the custodial parent relocates. 123
This use of the "harm" approach can be thought of as a strengthening of the
parental preference standard. Prior cases often discuss the question of
parental unfitness in the abstract, considering whether the character of the
parent dictates that the child should not be given to that parent. 124 The harm
requirement strongly suggests that a nexus must exist between the alleged
unfitness and the effect of the unfitness on the child. Thus, under this
approach, a court could find a parent unfit only if the unfitness causes serious
harm to the child. This interpretation would comport with the court's
approach in prior cases. 1
25
3. The Legislative Standard of Title 10, Section 21.1B
In two fact patterns, the legislature has promulgated a substantive standard
for third-party cases. Title 10, section 21.1B of the Oklahoma Statutes,
amended in the 2001, 2002, and 2003 legislative sessions, 26 now provides
that:
B. Subject to subsection E of this section, when a parent having
physical custody and providing support to a child becomes
deceased or when the custody is judicially removed from such
parent, the court may only deny the noncustodial parent custody of
the child or guardianship of the child if:
1. a. For a period of at least twelve (12) months out of the last
fourteen (14) months immediately preceding the determination of
custody or guardianship action, the noncustodial parent has
121. Id.'19, 14P.3dat550.
122. 2001 OK 30, 23 P.3d 278.
123. See id. 1 40, 23 P.3d at 288.
124. See cases cited supra notes 74-82.
125. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 1995 OK 87, 10, 904 P.2d 66, 70 (parent's sexual preference
must affect the child in order to change custody); Gorham v. Gorham, 1984 OK 90, 1 14, 692
P.2d 1375, 1378 (there must be a nexus between the complained of conduct of the parent and
the child).
126. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 21-22 (West) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1 (B)); Act Relating to Children, ch. 445, § 1, 2002 Okla. Sess.
Laws 1798, 1799 (current version to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1 (B)); Act Relating to
Children, ch. 141, § 1,2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 714, 714-15 (current version to be codified at 10
OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)).
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willfully failed, refused, or neglected to contribute to the child's
support:
(1) in substantial compliance with a support provision or an
order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction adjudicating the
duty, amount, and manner of support, or
(2) according to such parent's financial ability to contribute to
the child's support if no provision for support is provided in a
decree of divorce or an order of modification subsequent thereto,
and
b. The denial of custody or guardianship is in the best interest of
the child;
2. The noncustodial parent has abandoned the child as such term
is defined by Section 7006-1.1 of this title;
3. The parental rights of the noncustodial parent have been
terminated;
4. The noncustodial parent has been convicted of any crime
defined by the Oklahoma Child Abuse Reporting and Prevention
Act or any crime against public decency and morality pursuant to
Title 21 of the.Oklahoma Statutes;
5. The child has been adjudicated deprived pursuant to the
Oklahoma Children's Code as a result of the actions of the
noncustodial parent and such parent has not successfully
completed any required service or treatment plan required by the
court; or
6. The court finds it would be detrimental to the health or safety
of the child for the noncustodial parent to have custody or be
appointed guardian.
27
Formerly, the statutory language applied only to those situations where the
custodial parent died and the resulting custody fight was between a parent and
a nonparent. 28 The 2001 amendment, however, added the phrase "or when
the custody is judicially removed from such parent."'2 9 The statute does not,
by its terms, apply to any other contest between a parent and a nonparent. For
example, in Marshall v. Marshall,'3° the father filed a motion to modify
custody.' He informally cared for the child until the mother took the child
127. § 3,2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. at 21-22 (to be codified at 10OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)).
128. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B) (Supp. 2000) (amended 2003).
129. Act Relating to Children, ch. 141, § 1,2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 714,714 (current version
to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 2 1.1(B)).
130. 1976 OK 127, 555 P.2d 598.
131. Id. 4, 555 P.2d at 599.
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to Texas and left the child with her brother. Originally, the mother did not
seek to retain custody, and the dispute involved the father and the mother's
brother. 3 2 The court ruled that the father was entitled to the child unless he
was proven affirmatively unfit.133 The court noted that if the mother retained
custody, she would leave the child with her brother.'34 This case would be
unaffected by the amended legislation because the dispute did not arise out of
the death of the custodial parent or the removal of the child from the custodial
parent. '35
Thus, the statute defines and limits the categories of noncustodial parents
who are not entitled to custody of their children following the death of the
custodial parent. The first category includes those parents who have willfully
failed to pay child support, either according to the divorce decree, or
according to their means if the divorce decree failed to specify an amount.136
In 2001, however, the legislature added language to indicate that even if a
parent pays no child support according to this section, it still must be in the
best interests of the child to award custody to a nonparent. ' This opens the
door for noncustodial parents who have maintained a substantial relationship
with their children to receive custody following the death of the custodial
parent, even when they have failed to pay support.
The second category of noncustodial parents who are not entitled to
custody includes those who have abandoned their children.' The 2001
amendments equated abandonment in this section with the term as defined in
the Children's Code, specifying when parental rights can be terminated.'
132. Id. 3, 555 P.2d at 599.
133. Id. 9, 555 P.2d at 599.
134. Id. 1 11,555 P.2d at 600.
135. The statute also would not apply to cases like Duffy v. King, 1960 OK 57, 350 P.2d
277. In that case, the Texas divorce decree placed the child with the maternal grandmother until
such time as the mother remarried. The mother remarried and commenced proceedings for the
return of the child. The court held that she was entitled to the child unless proven unfit. See id.
Tl 17-18, 350 P.2d at 280.
136. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 21-22 (West) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(1)(a)). Earlier cases where a parent lost custody to a
nonparent because of, among other reasons, a failure to pay child support, will continue to be
good law. See, e.g., Osburn v. Roberts, 19460K 129,12, 169 P.2d 293,294; Taylor v. Taylor,
19380K 77,16, 75 P.2d 1132, 1134. Those cases, where a failure to pay child support was not
determinative should no longer be considered authoritative. See, e.g., Hood v. Adams, 1964 OK
217, 4, 396 P.2d 483, 484 (father had not paid child support in three years).
137. Act Relating to Children, ch. 141, § 1, 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 714, 714-15 (current
version to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(1)).
138. § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. at 22 (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(13)(2)).
139. Act Relating to Children, ch. 141, § 1, 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 714, 714-15 (current
version to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(1)).
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These provisions have been substantially broadened in recent years. The
Children's Code now provides that:
For purposes of this paragraph the term "abandonment" includes,
but is not limited to, the following:
a. the parent has left the child alone or in the care of another
who is not the parent of the child without identifying the child or
furnishing a means of identification for the child, the whereabouts
of the parents are unknown, and the child's identity cannot be
ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
b. the parent has voluntarily left the child alone or in the care of
another who is not the parent of the child and expressed a willful
intent by words, actions, or omissions not to return for the child, or
c. the parent fails to establish and/or maintain a substantial and
positive relationship with the child for a period of six (6)
consecutive months out of the last fourteen (14) months
immediately preceding the filing of a petition for termination of
parental rights. For purposes of this paragraph, "establish and/or
maintain a substantial and positive relationship" includes, but is
not limited to:
(1) frequent and regular contact with the minor through frequent
and regular visitation and/or frequent and regular communication
to or with the child, and
(2) the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities.
Incidental or token visits or communications shall not be
sufficient to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive
relationship with the child.
40
The amendment clearly states that lack of visitation or contact with a child
serves as a basis for awarding custody to a nonparent. The amendment
effectively overrules the 1987 case In re McNeely.'41 In McNeely, the court
held that a parent who has not "failed to discharge any court-imposed
obligation or some well-defined legal duty and who bore no custodial
responsibility does not come within the purview of [the term] 'abandon-
ment.""142 This new statutory definition of abandonment, however, comports
with a number of earlier Oklahoma cases. In Bishop v. Benear,143 the Court
articulated the following standard:
140. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7006-1.1(A)(2) (2001).
141. 1987 OK 19, 734 P.2d 1294.
142. Id. 8, 734 P.2d at 1297.
143. 1928 OK 553, 270 P. 569.
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We are not unmindful of the fact that a parent, by nature as well as
by law, has a legal right to the custody of his minor children, but
this strict legal right to the custody of the children must give way
to the welfare of the child where for a number of years the parent
has permitted the custody of his children to their grandparents,
permitted their affections to grow up, as in the case at bar.'"
Problems of abandonment parallel those confronting the court in Baby Girl
L. The problem in restoring a child to a parent who has previously abandoned
him is in the psychological effects on the child resulting from removing him
from the only home he has ever known, even if that home is with a nonparent.
Seemingly, the result of Baby Girl L. is that abandonment must have the same
effect on the child as it had in that case to justify denying custody to the
parent. In other words, if the child can be restored to the parent without long-
term, severe psychological effect, the child is not abandoned under section
21.1(B).
The 2003 amendments also added four new grounds for refusing custody
to the surviving parent. First, the court may deny custody to the noncustodial
parent if the parental rights of that parent have been terminated. 14 Second,
the child need not be given to the noncustodial parent if the child has been
adjudicated a deprived child as a result of the actions of the noncustodial
parent, and the noncustodial parent has not completed the parenting plan set
out by the Juvenile Court.'46 Third, custody may be refused if the parent has
been convicted of child abuse or, indeed, any crime defined as being against
public decency and morality under Title 21. " ' Finally, this entire section is
subject to subsection E of section 21.1, which requires the court to determine
144. Id. 1 16, 270 P. at 571; see also Sims v. Sims, 1960 OK 68, 5, 350 P.2d 493, 494
(father had become a stranger to the child over the last fifteen and one-half years); Matthews v.
Grant, 1958 OK 150,1 15, 326 P.2d 1043, 1048 (father had neither seen child nor paid support
for a number of years); Exparte Hudspeth, 1954 OK 172, 12, 271 P.2d 371, 373 (child had
seen his father only two or three times in his life); Long v. Mclninch, 1953 OK 372, 1 8, 264
P.2d 767, 769 (mother had not seen children in eight years); Hamann v. Miesner, 1931 OK 91,
14, 297 P. 252, 254 (father had not seen child in five years). However a different result should
occur in cases such as Application of Grover, 1984 OK 20, 681 P.2d 81, and Gowin v. Julius,
1954 OK 359, 279 P.2d 954. In both cases, the noncustodial father received custody of the
child even though he had no contact with the child for a period of years. This interpretation
would further the best interests of the child in continuing the child's stable physical
environment.
145. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 22 (West) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(3)).
146. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.113)(5)).
147. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(4)).
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whether any person seeking custody is subject to the Oklahoma Sex Offenders
Registration Act,4 8 or a similar statute in another state. 49 The statute creates
a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to such a person is not in the
best interests of the child.' 0
Finally, the statute allows the court to award custody to a nonparent when
awarding custody to the noncustodial parent would be "detrimental to the
health or safety of the child."'' The legislature failed to further explain the
category. Perhaps the best way to understand the phrase "detrimental to the
health or safety of the child" is as a codification of the time-honored
"affirmatively unfit" standard. However, the effect of Baby Girl L. may be to
hold that the alleged unfitness must be so great as to result in harm to the
child.
Case law has never properly answered the question of whether this
legislative standard - for situations involving the awarding of custody as an
original matter in cases where the custodial parent has died - should be
extended to the initial award in all third-party custody cases. The issue was
present but not argued in State ex rel. Department of Human Services v.
Stansbury.'52 After a paternity proceeding, the court ordered the father to pay
support to the mother.'53 The father did so for four years. The mother
subsequently married, ultimately divorced, and received custody of the child
in her divorce. After the divorce, the mother asked her former in-laws to care
for the child because she was unable to do so. They brought guardianship
proceedings without notifying the biological father.'54 The father then
intervened in the divorce proceeding, seeking custody of the child. He also
petitioned the probate court for guardianship.'55 The guardianship request was
held in abeyance, pending the outcome of the custody determination.' 56
The court held a trial to determine whether the father had satisfied the
"parental opportunity" test.'57 The trial court determined that he had, and that
he was a fit parent. It then awarded custody to the father.5 8 The in-laws
appealed and the appellate panel affirmed. "' The in-laws argued that the trial
148. 57 OKLA. STAT. §§ 581-587, 589 (2001).
149. § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. at 22 (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(E)).
150. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(E)(2)).
151. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B)(6)).
152. 2001 OK CIV APP 113, 30 P.3d 1180.
153. Id. 13, 30 P.3d at 1181.
154. Id.




159. Id. 7, 30 P.3d at 1182.
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court erred in finding that the father had exercised his parental opportunity
interest, arguing that his parental opportunity interest was extinguished
because he failed to invoke his rights through enforcement of the visitation
order and because he stopped paying child support when the in-laws became
temporary guardians of the child. 6 The panel, however, rejected the
argument that a parent must exercise his parental opportunity before he is
entitled to pursue a motion to obtain custody of his child.' 6 ' The panel
observed that courts have applied the parental opportunity interest test only
"in cases where a party desiring to adopt a child attempts to terminate a
putative parent's right without notice," and, thus, held that the test did not
apply to the proceeding.' 62
It is unclear from the opinion whether the case was argued incorrectly or
whether the appellate panel failed to understand the issue. On one hand, the
panel was correct in holding that the "parental opportunity" standard applies
only to adoption cases. However, title 10, section 21.lB of the Oklahoma
Statutes provides that after the death of the custodial parent, the court may
deny the noncustodial parent guardianship and custody if the situation meets
the provisions of the section.'63
While the section applies only to those situations where the custodial parent
dies or the court terminates a parent's custody, Stansbury presented an
opportunity for the court to determine whether this section should apply to all
third-party custody cases. If the statute applied, the father - unless it was not
in the best interests of the child - should have been denied custody because
he failed to pay child support for twelve of the preceding fourteen months and
apparently had not visited the child for six of the last twelve months. It
seems - because the legislature has issued standards for awarding custody to
a third party - that instead of awarding custody to the child's parent in cases
involving death or the judicial removal of a child from the custodial parent,
these standards would be appropriate in all third-party custody cases.
B. Nonparent vs. Nonparent
Another unresolved problem in third-party cases is determining which
substantive standard to apply when the case involves only nonparents. These
cases occur after the death of both parents when different relatives desire
160. ld.14,30P.3datll8l.
161. Id. 7, 30 P.3d at 1182.
162. Id.14,30P.3datll8l.
163. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 17, 21-22 (West) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(B))
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custody. The traditional standard for such cases has been solely the best
interests of the child. 164
In 1983, the legislature radically changed child custody law in Oklahoma
by repealing the "tender years presumption"' 65 and enacting title 10, section
21. 1(A). 66 The statute appears to list possible custodians of a child in order
of preference, "according to the best interests of the child.' 67 The statute
received its only construction in Application of Smith.168 In Smith, the minor
child lived with his mother and stepfather. The mother died of cancer. The
stepfather filed his petition to adopt on the same day the mother died. Almost
immediately the maternal grandmother filed a writ of habeas corpus. 169 The
trial court consolidated both actions and, after a hearing on the merits, granted
the stepfather guardianship of the minor child. 70 The grandmother appealed,
alleging that section 21. 1(A) entitled her to custody because the statute lists
grandparents second in order of preference.' 7 '
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals disagreed with the grandmother. It
found that the controlling language in the statute was the phrase "according
to the best interests of the child."'72 The court also noted that (1) prior to her
death, the mother had expressed a desire that the stepfather receive custody of
the child; (2) the child had stated that she wished to live with her stepfather;
and (3) the stepfather provided a stable home environment for the child.'
Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in awarding custody
of the child to the stepfather. 74 The court concluded that when both parties
are fit, custody is not to be decided solely on the basis of the preference list. 7
164. See In re Reyna, 1976 OK 18, 116, 546 P.2d 622, 624 (juvenile proceeding); Gould
v. Smith, 1965 OK 112, 1 9, 405 P.2d 82, 85 (guardianship); Application of Boyd, 1954 OK
235, 1 5, 274 P.2d 399, 400 (habeas); In re Borcherding's Custody, 1945 OK 247, 1 10, 162
P.2d 184, 186; Exparte Fortune,1936 OK 46,16, 53 P.2d 1100, 1101.
165. A child of tender years was to be given to the mother; if the child was old enough to
learn a trade the child was to be given to the father. See 30 OKLA. STAT. § 11 (1981), repealed
by Act Relating to Children, ch. 269, 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws 773; Gordon v. Gordon, 1978 OK
17, 577 P.2d 1271 (1978) (upholding statute against an equal protection challenge).
166. Act Relating to Children, ch. 269, § 1, 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws 773, 773 (current version
to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 2 1.1(A)).
167. § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. at 21 (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.1(A)).
168. 1992 OK CIV APP 97, 837 P.2d 929.
169. Id. 1 2, 837 P.2d at 930.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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III. The Substantive Standard: Modification Cases
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has drastically changed the rules on
modifications in third-party custody cases in the last few years. In McDonald
v. Wrigley, 176 the court opined in dicta that custody, even on a temporary basis,
can be awarded to a grandparent or a third party only if the court finds the
parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence.' 77 The court also held that the
order must include the conditions creating the parental unfitness. 7 8 The court
reasoned that this must be done "so that the parent knows what, if corrected,
would amount to a change of condition in the eyes of the court."' 79 Thus, all
orders awarding custody to nonparents are considered temporary orders. The
court will allow the parent to regain custody upon a showing that the parent
has corrected the conditions that led to the trial court granting custody to a
third party.
The court's dicta in McDonald came to fruition in Guardianship of
M.R.S. 180 In M.R.S. the father moved to terminate the guardianship of his
child.' 8' The parents had divorced following the mother's abandonment.
82
Shortly thereafter, the father had agreed to the guardianship because he was
on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and therefore could not
care for the child.8 3 The court had awarded him liberal visitation and ordered
him to pay child support and medical expenses. 84 Moreover, the order
appointing the guardians specifically stated that the court had not found the
father unfit to care for the child.8 5 The father subsequently moved to
terminate the guardianship based upon changes in his circumstances; he had
remarried and claimed that he was able to provide a home for the child.
86
The trial court applied a standard for modifying custody in a divorce case
derived from Gibbons v. Gibbons,87 and required the father to show that there
had been a permanent, material, and substantial change of circumstances since
the guardianship order that directly affected the best interests of the child -
in other words, that the child would be substantially better off with the father
176. 1994 OK 25, 870 P.2d 777.
177. Id. 112, 870 P.2d at 781.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 1998 OK 38, 960 P.2d 357.
181. Id. 1 1,960 P.2d at 358.
182. Id. 1 2, 960 P.2d at 358.
183. Id.
184. Id. '13, 960 P.2d at 358-59.
185. Id. 13, 960 P.2d at 359.
186. Id. 14, 960 P.2d at 359.
187. 1968 OK 77, 442 P.2d 482.
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than with his current guardians. 8 ' Applying the test, the trial court concluded
that the child would be just as well off with the guardians as with the father
and denied the motion. 89
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed.' 90 The court faced the issue of
defining the proper standard, in a guardianship proceeding, for modification
of custody when custody has been granted to a third party. The court
therefore faced the conflicting standards between Gibbons and In re
Guardianship of Hatfield.'9' In Hatfield, without discussing the Gibbons case
decided four years earlier, the court determined that the standard for
terminating the guardianship of a child was that the guardianship was "no
longer necessary."'9 -The court held in M.R.S. that the appropriate standard
was found in Hatfield and appeared to say that Gibbons supplied the
appropriate test only for cases involving parents in divorce proceedings. 93
The court arrived at this conclusion by examining a number of prior third-
party custody cases' 94 that, the court stated, clearly established the parental
preference doctrine in Oklahoma. The court therefore held that, in the
absence of a showing of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence,
the father was entitled to custody.' 95 The court then reaffirmed McDonald, to
the extent that it held that all third-party custody orders, absent an order
terminating parental rights under the Children's Code, are temporary. 96 A
guardianship is "no longer necessary," the court held, "when the impediment
to the natural parent's custody has been removed, unless to do so would be
inimical to the welfare of the child."' 97 The person seeking termination of a
guardianship bears the burden of proving that guardianship is "no longer
necessary."' 98 The party must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he
has corrected "the conditions that led to [the] creation of the guardianship."'99
188. M.R.S., 16, 960 P.2d at 359.
189. Id. '15,960 P.2d at 359.
190. Id. '128, 960 P.2d at 365.
191. 1972 OK 10, 493 P.2d 819.
192. Id. 8,493 P.2d at 821. The language appears in the guardianship statutes at title 30,
section 4-804 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
193. M.R.S., UI 13, 26, 960 P.2d at 361, 364.
194. The cases the court cited were Hollick v. McDaniel, 1965 OK 64,401 P.2d 466, Hood
v. Adams, 1964 OK 217, 396 P.2d 483, Alford v. Thomas, 1957 OK 218, 316 P.2d 188, and
Sherrick v. Butler, 1936 OK 70, 53 P.2d 1097.
195. M.R.S., 16, 960 P.2d at 362.
196. Id. 19, 960 P.2d at 360.
197. Id. 26, 960 P.2d at 364.
198. Id.
199. Id. 26, 960 P.2d at 364-65.
[Vol. 56:415
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/20
2003] THIRD PARTY CUSTODY AFTER BABY GIRL L. & A.G.S. 439
If the person found unfit is a parent, then he must establish his fitness.2" If
the court has not found the parent unfit, "then the parent must show that the
conditions which resulted in the guardianship... have changed and that the
parent is now able to take care of his child[]., 2 1' Because the M.R.S. court
never found the parent unfit, and because he had corrected the conditions that
led to the establishment of the guardianship, the court held that he was entitled
to the return of his child.202 The court did not expound on the meaning of the
phrase "inimical to the welfare of the child."
These two decisions have generated considerable confusion. They are
consistent with only one aspect of the court's past third-party modification
cases. In those cases where the custodial parent has allowed third parties to
raise the child, the common law entitles the noncustodial parent to custody
without showing either a change of circumstances, as required by Gibbons v.
Gibbons, °3 or the presentation of newly discovered evidence, as Carpenter v.
Carpenter 2' demands. For example, in Haralson v. Haralson,°5 the divorce
decree awarded custody to the mother.2" She never assumed custody of the
children, however; instead, they lived for three years with their
grandparents. 27 At the time the father filed to gain custody, the mother had
no intention of assuming custody. 2 s Because the evidence showed that
leaving custody with the mother would constitute, in effect, granting it to the
grandparents, the court held that the father was entitled to custody.20 9 The
court analyzed the case as a custody contest between the father and the
grandparents.210 Absent clear and convincing evidence of the father's
unfitness, he was entitled to custody of the child.21 ' The court discussed
neither the changed circumstances test nor the newly discovered evidence test.
In short, the rule appears to be that if the custodial parent leaves the child
in the care of third parties, he loses the right to custody granted in the decree.
If the noncustodial parent is fit, the law entitles him to a modified decree
granting him custody.21 2 A party need not prove a change of conditions or
200. Id. 26, 960 P.2d at 365.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 1968 OK 77, 1 4, 442 P.2d 482, 484.
204. 1982 OK 38, 13, 645 P.2d 476, 481.
205. 1979 OK 73, 595 P.2d 443.
206. Id. 1 1,595 P.2d at 444.
207. Id.1 4, 595 P.2d at 444.
208. Id.
209. Id. 1 8, 595 P.2d at 445.
210. Id. 15, 595 P.2d at 445.
211. Id. 17, 595 P.2d at 445.
212. There are a couple of inconsistent decisions where the custodial parent had abandoned
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point to newly discovered evidence. However, the noncustodial parent must
be prepared to actually exercise custody. The court will not modify the
original custody order if the noncustodial parent merely plans to place the
children with a different set of grandparents.213
The cases cited by the court in M.R.S. that seem to support a return of the
child to the custodial parent, without application of the Gibbons standard,
were not on point. These cases, like Haralson, only supplied the applicable
standard for situations involving an original custody determination between
parents and nonparents. In third-party cases involving modifications of
custody, another long line of Oklahoma decisions holds that once the initial
custody order places the child with a third party, particularly in a divorce case,
the standard for modification is the same as for any other custody decree: the
movant must show that there has been a substantial change of circumstances
that directly affects the child and that, as a result, the child would be
substantially better off with the moving party.214
None of these cases were cited or discussed by the M.R.S. court. This
raises the question of whether the court overruled these cases by silence. If
so, then the standard for change of custody in a third-party case would be as
set out by the court in M.R.S., regardless of the form of the action. On the
other hand, the possibility exists that the court intended to address only change
of custody in the context of a termination of a guardianship. If that is the case,
then the earlier decisions would retain vitality when the case involves a
change of custody in the context of a divorce proceeding. The latter
interpretation seems unlikely given that M.R.S. cites McDonaldwith approval,
and that McDonald involved a potential change of custody to a third party in
a divorce proceeding. Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize forty years
of contrary precedent when it decided M.R.S.
Another problem arising from M.R.S. concerns its relationship to title 10,
section 21.1(B) of the Oklahoma Statutes. The statute was not discussed in
either M.R.S. or McDonald. If a court awards custody to a nonparent under
the abandonment or child support provisions of the statute, it raises the
question of what the custodial parent must do to regain custody of the child.
the child. See Nowlin v. Nowlin, 1976 OK CIV APP 35, 551 P.2d 1177 (court did not award
custody to mother where father had allowed grandparents to raise the children and mother had
not seen the children in nine years); Price v. Price, 1956 OK 271, 302 P.2d 772.
213. See Exparte Lebsack, 1934 OK 314, 32 P.2d 923.
214. See Johnson v. Johnson, 1984 OK 19,19, 681 P.2d 78, 80; Wills v. Wills, 1960 OK
16, 10, 349 P.2d 1, 3; Adams v. Adams, 1956 OK 51,1 10, 294 P.2d 831, 835; Russell v.
Russell, 1953 OK 21, 11, 253 P.2d 136, 138; Potter v. Potter, 1950 OK 170, 13, 219 P.2d
1011, 1014; Garlin v. Garlin, 1932 OK 52,1 11, 7 P.2d 463,464; Morris v. Morris, 1921 OK
148, 1 9, 198 P. 70, 73.
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Under the court's reasoning in M.R.S. and McDonald, it appears that if the
noncustodial parent begins paying support, the parent becomes entitled to
custody."t 5 How many payments are necessary is very unclear. The same is
true if the third party receives custody under the abandonment prong. If the
noncustodial parent reestablishes a parental relationship with the child, is that
parent automatically entitled to regain custody? Application of Baby Girl L.
suggests that, if the parent is fit, the court should determine whether harm
would result if the child is returned to the natural parent and implement a plan
to transition the child to his parent.
Unfortunately, the court returned to the area of third-party custody
modifications in In re Guardianship of A.G.S. 216 without resolving the
confusion. The mother, in 1996, agreed to allow her parents to assume
guardianship over her child after the Oklahoma County District Attorney's
Office told her that she would be charged with murder because her current
boyfriend had killed her other child when she was in the home.217 In 2000, she
filed a motion to dismiss the guardianship and resume custody of the child.21 8
The grandparents opposed the motion.219 The parties presented the court with
conflicting evidence concerning the mother's visitation with the child and her
payment of support for the child,22' as well as conflicting evidence concerning
the violent tendencies of the mother's current husband.22' The trial court
found the mother to be a fit parent and terminated the guardianship.222
The grandparents appealed and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed.223 The panel followed M.R.S., in holding that a guardianship can be
terminated when, assuming the parent is fit, the conditions that led to the
creation of the guardianship no longer exist.224 According to the appellate
panel, the petition clearly indicated that the guardianship was created because
the mother believed she was to be incarcerated. 225 Because she was never sent
to prison, the condition that created the guardianship no longer existed.226 The
panel also found sufficient evidence in the record to justify the trial court's
215. See supra notes 179, 197.
216. 2003 OK 1, 65 P.3d 587.
217. Id. ft 2-3, 65 P.3d at 587-88.
218. Id. 12, 65 P.3d at 587-88. Ultimately the mother was never charged with murder.
219. Id. 1 2, 65 P.3d at 588.
220. In re Guardianship of A.G.S., No. 96,396, at 3 (Okla. Civ. App. Apr. 26, 2002),
available at http://oklegal.onenet.net/sample.basic.html (A.G.S. II).
221. A.G.S., TI 5-6, 65 P.3d at 588.
222. Id. 12, 65 P.3d at 589.
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findings that the mother had visited the child, paid support, and that the-
violent tendencies of the mother's husband, if any, were never directed
towards the children.227 The panel also rejected the argument that the court
should use a best interests analysis in reaching its decision.228
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed both the
appeals court and the trial court.229 The court focused on the phrase from
M.R.S. that a guardianship may be terminated when the conditions that led to
the guardianship no longer exist and the termination of the guardianship
would not be "inimical to the welfare of the child."23 The court then,
apparently, reweighed the evidence and concluded that the trial court
erred.23" ' It noted that the original reason for the creation of the guardian-
ship - that the mother might be indicted and convicted of murder - was
removed years before she petitioned for the termination of the
guardianship.232 It found overwhelming evidence that the mother was
227. Id. U 3, 12.
228. Id. [12.
229. In re Guardianship of A.G.S., 2003 OK 1, 65 P.3d 587.
230. Id. '113, 65 P.3d at 589.
231. Id. 20, 65 P.3d at 591. An appellate panel reviewing a case that originally sounded
in equity is entitled to reweigh the evidence in reviewing a trial court's determination. The
complete standard of review in equity cases in found in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 1982 OK 38,
645 P.2d 476, which states:
Custody contests are of equitable cognizance. The court may exercise continuing
jurisdiction of disputed claims. On appeal, the trial court's disposition is reviewed
by the standards applicable to chancery cases. The court's decision is presumed
to include a finding favorable to the successful party upon every fact necessary to
support it. While an appellate court may and will examine and weigh the
evidence, the findings and decree of the trial court cannot be disturbed unless
found to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Whenever possible, an
appellate court must render, or cause to be rendered, that judgment which in its
opinion the trial court should have rendered. A decree need not rest upon
uncontradicted evidence. It is not fatal to the validity of an equity decision if, on
the basis of the evidence presented, the chancellor might have been equally correct
in reaching a conclusion different from that which he actually did. If the result is
correct, the judgment is not vulnerable to reversal because the wrong reason was
given for the decision or because the trial court considered an immaterial issue or
made an erroneous finding of fact. We are not bound either by the reasoning or
the findings of the trial court. Whenever the law and the facts warrant, we may
affirm the judgment if it is sustainable on any rational theory and the ultimate
conclusion reached below is legally correct. Unless the decision is found to be
against the clear weight of the evidence, the appellate court must indulge in the
presumption that it is correct.
Id. [ 10, 645 P.2d at 480 (citations omitted).
232. A.G.S., '115, 65 P.3d at 590.
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satisfied to leave the child with the guardian until the mother's father
petitioned for an appointment as co-guardian and the Department of Human
Services sought to collect child support from her.233 It also found clear and
convincing evidence that the mother's current husband was a violent man
given that the mother and the guardian had filed several petitions for
protective orders against him.234
The court determined that title 10, section 21.3(C) of the Oklahoma
Statutes provides persuasive authority for the standards that a trial court
should consider when determining whether a termination of the guardianship
would be inimical to the child. 35 The statute provides that when a parent
relinquishes custody to a relative without a court order, the parent may not
obtain the child's return, absent the consent of the relative, without a court
decision. 236 When deciding whether to return the child to the parent, the court
is to consider:
(a) the duration of the abandonment and integration of the child
into the home of the relative,
(b) the preference of the child if the child is determined to be of
sufficient maturity to express a preference,
(c) the mental and physical health of the child, and
(d) such other factors as are necessary in the particular
circumstances.23 7
The court then found that the record demonstrated that returning the child
to the mother would be inimical to the child.238 It focused on the facts that the
mother delayed in filing to remove the guardianship, had not paid any child
support for the child and, in particular, that her current husband was a violent
man. 239 The court, however, ultimately rested its decision on the fact that the
murder of the mother's older daughter, for which she was never indicted and
which originally led to the creation of the guardianship, indicated that she
lived in a violent household. 24" Her current husband, the court stated, was also
233. Id.
234. See id. 20,65 P.3d at 591. The court failed to note that although the protective orders
were filed they were not granted. Telephone Interview with Neil Lynn, attorney for the mother
(Jan. 16, 2003).
235. A.G.S., 1 17, 65 P.3d at 590.
236. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 21.3(c) (2001).
237. Id. § 21.3(c)(2).
238. A.G.S., 1 20, 65 P.3d at 591.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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violent, and therefore, it concluded the reasons that led to the guardianship in
the first place still existed.241
The court's opinion does not help in the analysis of the problem regarding
modification of third-party custody decrees. The meaning of the phrase
"inimical to the welfare of the child" remains rather vague. Even though the
court refers to title 10, section 21.3(C) for guidance, it fails to indicate how
the standard of "inimical to the child" relates to other parts of the issue
regarding the return of a child. Clearly this appears to be something less than
parental unfitness. Indeed, in this case, neither the trial court nor the
Oklahoma Supreme Court found the parent unfit. Moreover, the test also must
be something more than simply the "best interests of the child." The court's
previous decisions clearly hold that a court may not deny a parent custody
simply because a third party might, on a comparative basis, be a better
parent. 42 It appears that the "inimical to the child" prong of the test falls
somewhere between these two standards and it also appears that the parent
bears the burden of showing that a transfer of custody would not be "inimical
to the child." If this prong of the test is to retain vitality, it seems that the
most appropriate standard for determining when a return would be "inimical
to the welfare of the child" should follow those standards set out by the
Oklahoma legislature in title 10, section 21.1. Once again, the court has failed
to consider the appropriate legislative enactments in arriving at its
determination in third-party custody cases. This obviously casts more
confusion into the area, the results of which will lead to conflicting decisions
at the trial court level and considerable confusion amongst the bar.
IV. The Confusion Continues
The inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's cases are mirrored in lower
court opinions which have often ignored both M.R.S. and McDonald to
produce what the lower court considered to be a more appropriate result in a
particular case. A classic recent example is In re N.L.W.,243 in which the
mother filed a habeas corpus petition to obtain the return of her child from the
paternal grandparents. 2" Following a custody dispute with the paternal
grandparents, the court awarded the mother custody of the two-year-old child
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl L., 2002 OK 9, 30, 51 P.3d 544, 557; Guardianship of
M.R.S., 1998 OK 38, 1 11, 960 P.2d 357, 361 (parent is entitled to custody unless found unfit.;
natural parents will not be deprived of custody simply because another family might be able to
provide more amenities and opportunities for the child).
243. 2000 OK CIV APP 20, 999 P.2d 448.
244. Id. 1 1,999 P.2d at 449.
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in November 1989.245 Later, however, she permitted the child to reside with
his paternal grandparents, from late 1990 through the spring of 1997.246 She
testified that, during this period, she spent as much time with the child as her
work requirements allowed. 247 The mother also testified that the child spent
most of the summer of 1997 with her and her husband and that she intended
to prepare the child to live with her.248
The trial court denied the mother's writ, reasoning that the grandparents
had provided the "only home.., this boy has ever known," and that it did not
want to upend the child "so close to the beginning of school. 2 49 The mother
appealed. 5°
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination.25' In doing so,
it ignored all recent case law from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, dismissing
precedent as "simply [reflecting] special guidance in applying the best
interests/balancing test to prevent it from being used to favor third parties on
the basis of 'comparative fitness." 252 It then employed older cases involving
habeas corpus to determine that the trial court could balance all interests
involved and decide the case on a simple best interests test.253 Applying that
test, the appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that
the child should continue to reside with the grandparents.254 The appellate
panel failed to discuss - or even to cite - M.R.S. or McDonald.
The appellate court in N.L.W. clearly agreed with the trial court that the
mother was a fit parent. 5 Moreover, neither court ever determined that the
reason that led the mother to place the child with the paternal grandparents
continued to exist. Indeed, the mother and her new husband apparently were
able to care for the child. 256 The facts appear to parallel those of M.R.S.,
where the court instituted a guardianship for the child when the father was
working so many hours that he was unable to care for the child. As soon as
he was no longer working those hours he was entitled to the return of his child





249. Id. 1 2, 999 P.2d at 449 (alteration in original).
250. Id.
251. Id. 1 15, 999 P.2d at 542.
252. Id. 14, 999 P.2d at 449.
253. Id. 15-14, 999 P.2d at 449-52.
254. Id. 13, 999 P.2d at 452.
255. Id. 14, 999 P.2d at 449.
256. See id. 13, 999 P.2d at 451-52.
257. Guardianship of M.R.S., 1998 OK 38, TI 4, 26, 960 P.2d 357, 359, 365.
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N.L.W. It would be ironic to conclude that it would be more difficult for a
parent to obtain a return of the child when there is no custody order in place
giving custody to the grandparents, as was the case in N.L.W, than when an
order for guardianship exists, as in M.R.S. However, this must be qualified by
the potential effect of the decision in Baby Girl L. If the child indeed would
suffer severe psychological trauma by the transfer for custody to the mother,
the decision would have been correct. The court would be required to
implement a plan, however, in which the child could be returned to the
mother.
The equities faced by the appellate panel are easy to understand. The child
had lived with the grandparents for seven years and the school year was just
about to begin.258 The panel felt strongly that the child should not be uprooted
from the only home he knew and placed in another environment, even though
he was to be placed with his parent.25 9 To reach this result, the court grasped
some earlier cases that would authorize their decision.26 ° Hopefully N.L. W.
will become just another classic example of why opinions from the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals are not precedential.26 '
Conclusion
The law on third-party custody continues to be in disarray. The fault for
this clearly lies with the Oklahoma Supreme Court. It has on several
occasions failed to completely analyze its prior cases. The court's failure to
indicate which cases it considers good law and which should be considered
overruled leads to opinions like N.L. W., where a court, confronted with a case
in which the equities favored the third party, utilized old cases from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court to justify its failure to even discuss some of the
more modern cases. In addition, the supreme court has consistently failed to
recognize appropriate legislation when it continues to ignore the effect of title
10, section 21.1 in formulating the substantive standards for awarding custody
to a third party and modifications for third-party custody decrees.
The two opinions handed down this past year have simply added to the
confusion. The Supreme Court gave no indication that it was aware that its
more "child focused" standard in Baby Girl L was a departure from past
decisions dealing with parental unfitness. The addition of the "inimical to the
child" prong to the standard for when a guardianship should be terminated and
258. Id. n 1-2, 999 P.2d at 449.
259. Id. 13, 999 P.2d at 451-52.
260. The court discussed Application of Grover, 1984 OK 20, 681 P.2d 81, Osburn v.
Roberts, 1946 OK 129, 169 P.2d 293, and Bishop v. Benear, 1928 OK 553, 270 P. 569.
261. OKLA. Sup. CT. R. 1.200(c)(2).
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the child returned the parent in Guardianship of A.G.S. remains undefined.
Its indefiniteness invites lawyers and judges to manipulate the standard to
arrive at inconsistent results in individual cases where the equities so dictate.
Given the unwillingness of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to analyze its prior
cases, it may be that the best hope of bringing uniformity and certainty to this
troubled area lies with the legislature.
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